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L a b o r Law-REPRESENTATION
ELECTIONS-NLRBWILL NO
~ PARTIES'
CAMPAIGN
LONGERPROBEINTO TRUTHOR F A L S IOF
STATEMENTS-ShoppingKart Food Market, Inc., 94 L.R.R.M.
1705 (NLRB 1977).
Shopping Kart Food Market, Inc. (the employer) objected to
the outcome of a labor representation election won by the Retail
Clerks, Local 99, AFL-CIO (the union). The employer's objection
was based on a significant misrepresentation, made by the
union's business representative, of the employer's profits.* The
Regional Director of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB
or the Board) overruled the employer's objection and certified the
union as the employees' bargaining representative. On review,
the Board affirmed the Regional Director's certification2 and
overruled its longstanding rule%f overturning elections because
of campaign misrepresentations.

A. NLRB Supervision of Representation Elections
Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)4gives
employees the right to choose, or refrain from choosing, a collecA bargaining representative chotive bargaining repre~entative.~
sen by the majority of employees becomes "the exclusive
[representative] of all the employees . . . for the purposes of
collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of
One method
employment, or other conditions of ernpl~yment."~
of determining the majority status of a collective bargaining representative is an NLRB-conducted representation election.'
1. The day before the election, the union's representative had told the employees that
the employer's profits for the last year had totaled $500,000. In fact, the employer's profits
had only totaled about $50,000.
2. Shopping Kart Food Mkt., Inc., 94 L.R.R.M. 1705, 1705 (NLRB 1977).
3. The rule is stated in Hollywood Ceramics Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 221 (1962).
4. 29 U.S.C. $4 151-168 (1970).
5. Id. Q 157.
6. Id. Q 159(a).
7. 1J . JENKINS,
LABOR
LAW§ 3.1 (I=): "Petitions for such an election may be filed
by (1) the employees, (2) any individual or labor organization acting on behalf of the
employees, or (3) by an employer confronted with a claim from an individual or labor
organization."
Before the Board can order an election, it must find that "a question of representation
affecting commerce exists." 29 U.S.C. 4 159(c)(l) (1970). Affecting commerce means "in
commerce, or burdening or obstructing commerce or the free flow of commerce, or having
led or tending to lead to a labor dispute burdening or obstructing commerce or the free
flow of commerce." Id. Q 152. "A question concerning representation exists when it is
necessary to determine the majority status of one or more labor organizations [or neither]
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Beyond the requirement that elections be conducted by secret ballot,qhe NLRA itself does not spell out the procedures for
the conduct of representation elections. Moreover, the Act "has
been interpreted as granting the NLRB 'a wide degree of discretion' in establishing" election rules and procedures and in determining the validity of election results.'
The Board has declared that manifestation of employees'
free choice is a purpose of representation elections.1° By regulating campaign conduct, the NLRB seeks to ensure that the employees are able to make a "reasoned, untrammeled choice" of a
bargaining representative.ll In order to protect the employees'
freedom of choice from improper employer or union influences,
the Board has sought to provide a "laboratory" in which conditions are as "nearly ideal as possible" for determining the
"uninhibited desires of the employees."12 Laboratory conditions
exist when, in the Board's opinion, there has been no interference
with the employees' free choice of their bargaining representative.13 Once the NLRB concludes that there has been interference
with free choice, the "automatic sanction" is invalidation of the
election. l4
in an appropriate unit." 1 J. JENKINS,
supra § 3.1.
The Board will not conduct a representation election unless it is shown that 30% or
more of the employees support the petition, or election. 29 U.S.C. § 159(e)(l)(1970); 29
C.F.R. 4 101.18 (1976).
8. 29 U.S.C. 5 159(c)(l)(1970). Pursuant to its rulemaking authority granted by 5 6
of the NLRA, the Board has promulgated procedural regulations for the conduct of representation elections and the filing of objections to representation elections in 29 C.F.R. $0
101.17-.21, 102 (1976).
OF ELECTION
CONDUCT
4
9. R. WILLIAMS,
P. JANUS,& K. HUHN,NLRB REGULA~ON
(Labor Relations and Public Policy Series No. 8, 1974) (quoting NLRB v. A.J. Tower Co.,
329 U.S. 324, 330 (1946)).
The courts have recognized that the Board's view on the regulation of preelection
propaganda should be granted deference because of the Board's expertise in that area.
Henderson Trumbull Supply Corp. v. NLRB, 501 F.2d 1224, 1228 (2d Cir. 1974).
10. General Shoe Corp., 77 N.L.R.B. 124, 126 (1948).
11. Sewell Mfg. Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 66, 69 (1962). The right of the employees to a
bargaining representative of their own choosing is guaranteed by 7 of the NLRA; the
Board regulates campaign propaganda to ensure that there has been no interference with
that right. Id.
12. General Shoe Corp., 77 N.L.R.B. 124, 127 (1948). When there has been interference with the employees' free choice, laboratory conditions have been breached and the
election must be reconducted so that the free choice of the employees may be determined.
Id.
13. See General Shoe Corp., 77 N.L.R.B. 124 (1948).
"[vhe 'laboratory conditions' doctrine . . . is of such an ambiquous [sic] nature
that it has been subjected to a multitude of interpretations, none of which have outlasted
P. JANUS,& K. Hum, SUPM note 9, a t 11.
their author's Board tenure." R. WILLIAMS,
14. R. WILLIAMS,P. JANUS,
& K. Hum, supra note 9, at 5.

210

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[1978:

No definitive statement can be made, however, as to what
conduct will be found to interfere with the employees' freedom of
choice;15 the Board's composition a t a given time is likely to be
determinative.16The Board's standards for the regulation of campaign conduct have been developed on a case-by-case basis," and
have often been applied inconsistently.18 In addition, the Board
has apparently applied a double standard when evaluating campaign conduct19-interference with employee free choice is more
readily found when employer interference is alleged than when
union interference is claimed.20For these reasons, the Board's
-

-

-

15. The Board regulates campaign conduct that is "deemed likely to coerce, mislead,
or otherwise improperly influence the voters." R. WILLIAMS,
P. JANUS,
& K. HUHN,supra
note 9, a t 12. Campaign conduct includes all of the acts of the union and employer during
the critical preelection period that are calculated to influence the employees to vote for
or against the union. See generally id. The critical preelection period is the period between
the time the election petition is filed and the time the election is conducted. Ideal Elec.
& Mfg. Co., 134 N.L.R.B. 1275 (1961).
By protecting the employees' free choice, the Board seeks to prevent interference
"with an informed and reasoned assessment of the consequences of selecting a union."
Bok, The Regulation of Campaign Tactics in Representation Elections Under the National
Labor Relations Act, 78 HARV.L. REV.38, 47 (1964).
P. JANUS,
& K. HUHN,supra note 9, at 6.
16. R. WILLIAMS,
17. Id. "[qhe Board's election case rulings have often tended to be narrow and
limited to particular fact situations, and few comprehensive statements of election policy
have emerged." Id.
18. J. GETMAN,
S. GOLDBERG,
& J. HERMAN,
UNIONREPRESENTATION
ELECTIONS:
LAW
AND REALITY
21 (1976).
19. Raskin, Deregulation of Union Campaigns: Restoring the First Amendment
Balance, 28 STAN.L. REV.1175, 1175-76 (1976): "[Tlhe standards applied by the Labor
Board have been so imprecise and usually so one-sided in their definition of what is
coercive that they offend both fairness and reason."
On at least two occasions the courts have disapproved of the Board's unfair application of a double standard. See Wilkinson Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 456 F.2d 298 (8th Cir. 1972);
NLRB v. Sanitary Laundry, Inc., 441 F.2d 1368 (10th Cir. 1971).
20. Smither, Does the Goalpost Move When Employers Kick About Union Misconduct During Elections?, 25 LAB.L.J. 578, 578 (1974):
[unions . . . file objections almost twice as frequently as employers but
their success rate since 1969 has been approximately three times that of employers, and in 1970 the probability that the Board would sustain objections filed
by a union was four times greater than in the case of employer objections.
Employer statements are more likely to be found coercive because the employer is in a
position to carry out his threats while the union is not. Id. a t 581. See also Fairweather,
What Can Employers Do in Election Campaigns?, 17 N.Y. CONF.LAB.183 (1964).
The lack of definition, the inconsistency, and the one-sidedness of the NLRB's regulation of campaign conduct, however, have not prevented the NLRB from maintaining its
claim of expertise in determining when campaign conduct has interfered with the employ& J. HERMAN,
supra note 18, at 4 n.20. The courts
ees' free choice. J. GEWAN,S. GOLDBERG,
have accepted the Board's claim of expertise as fact. Id.
The source of the Board's expertise is found in the "sheer volume of cases handled."
Smither, supra at 581. One court has said that "[flrom its supervision and review of
thousands of representation elections each year, no area is more within the expertise of
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regulation of election conduct has been widely ~ r i t i c i z e d . ~ ~
The issue in an election interference case is not whether there
has been an unfair labor practice; rather, the question centers on
whether there has been interference with the employees' free
choice.22An unfair labor practice need not be shown.23In fact,
propaganda that interferes with free choice encompasses a
broader range of propaganda than does the related class of unfair
labor practices. Unfair labor practices are limited to conduct that
is in the nature of coercion,24while interference with free choice
has been found to result from misrepresentations, fraud, or coer~ion.~~
But, because the free choice standard is less restrictive than
the standard applied to unfair labor practices, the finding of an
unfair labor practice is, "[a] fortiori, conduct which interferes
with the [employees'] exercise of free and untrammeled choice
in [a representation] election."26 Thus, if the Board finds an
unfair labor practice has occurred during the critical preelection
period, the Board may without further inquiry conclude that
there has been interference with the employees' free choice. The
finding of an unfair labor practice in the representation election
context is therefore important only in that it enables the NLRB
to find that the employees' free choice has been interfered with
without making a specific determination to that effect.

B. Development of the Hollywood Ceramics Rule
The Board's policy regarding the impact of the truth or falthe Board than the proper limits of campaign propaganda and the impact of employer
and union statements upon the employees' exercise of free choice." NLRB v. Golden Age
Beverage Co., 415 F.2d 26,30 (5th Cir. 1969). The Board's claim of expertise has not gone
unchallenged, however. See Getman & Goldberg, The Myth of Labor Board Expertise, 39
U . C H I L.
. REV.681 (1972).
21. See Raskin, supra note 19; Smither, supra note 20.
22. Hicks-Hayward Co., I18 N.L.R.B. 695, 695 n. 1 (1957).
23. General Shoe Corp., 77 N.L.R.B. 124, 126 (1948).
24. 29 U.S.C. 4 158(a), (b) (1970). "The [NLRA] condemns only improper influence
which is in the nature of coercion." J.S. Dillion & Sons Stores Co. v. NLRB, 338 F.2d 395,
399 (10th Cir. 1964).
25. See Sprague Ponce Co., 181 N.L.R.B. 281 (1970) (coercion interfered with election
though no unfair labor practice found); Hollywood Ceramics Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 221 (1962)
(misrepresentation interfered with election); Shovel Supply Co., 121 N.L.R.B. 1485 (1958)
(threat couched in the form of an opinion interfered with election); United Aircraft Corp.,
103 N.L.R.B. 102 (1953) (fraud interfered with election though no unfair labor practice
found).
26. Dal-Tex Optical Co., 137 N.L.R.B. 1782, 1786-87 (1962).
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sity of campaign propaganda on employee free choice was originally one of n~ninterference.~'
But in United Aircraft Gorp.,"
where one union distributed a forged telegram in which the opposing union's president purportedly apologized for his union's
improper conduct and praised the other union's president, the
Board found that the employees' freedom of choice had been
interfered with because it was impossible for the employees to
recognize the forged telegram as campaign propaganda and discount it acc~rdingly.~~
In a later case, the Board stated that
as a general rule, and in the absence of coercion, [the Board]
will not undertake to censor or police union campaigns or to
consider the truth or falsity of electioneering propaganda, unless
the ability of the employees to evaluate such material has been
so impaired by the campaign material or by campaign trickery
that the uncoerced desires of the employees cannot be determined.30

In Gummed Products C O . ,the
~ ~ Board overturned an election
because a union's misstatement of wage rates in a competing
unionized plant, made the day before the election, interfered with
The
the employees' free choice of a bargaining representati~e.~~
Board recalled that it did not usually "censor or police preelection
propaganda by parties to elections, absent threats or acts of violence," but recognized that there were "some limits on campaign
tactics."33 The Board observed that "[e]xaggerations, inaccuracies, partial truths, name-calling, and falsehoods, while not condoned, may be excused as legitimate propaganda, provided they
are not so misleading as to prevent the exercise of a free choice
by the employees in the election of their bargaining representative. "34
Then, in United States Gypsum Co.," the Board set aside an
election won by the employer where, two days before the election,
27. Union campaign propaganda was not examined, and employers were not permitP. JANUS,& K. HUHN,
supra note 9, a t 17-18.
ted to campaign. R. WILLIAMS,
28. 103 N.L.R.B. 102 (1953).
29. Id. at 103-04.The Board returns to this level of campaign regulation in the instant
case. Shopping Kart Food Mkt., Inc., 228 N.L.R.B. No. 190, 94 L.R.R.M. 1705, 1708
(1977).
30. Radio Corp. of America, 106 N.L.R.B. 1393, 1394 (1953).
31. 112 N.L.R.B. 1092 (1955).
32. Id. a t 1094.
33. Id. a t 1093 (emphasis added).
The limits referred to by the Board were the limits imposed in United Aircraft Corp.,
103 N.L.R.B. 102 (1953).
34. Gummed Prods. Co., 112 N.L.R.B. a t 1093-94.
35. 130 N.L.R.B. 901 (1961).
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the employer read to the employees a telegram containing deliberate misrepresentation^.^^ The Board held that
when one of the parties deliberately misstates material facts
which are within its special knowledge, under such circumstances that the other party or parties cannot learn about them
in time to point out the misstatements, and the employees
themselves lack independent knowledge to make possible a
proper evaluation of the misstatements the Board will find that
the bounds of legitimate campaign propaganda have been exceeded and will set aside an ele~tion.~'

Finally, in Hollywood Ceramics C O . , the
~ ~ Board held that
the union's misrepresentation of wage rates, made the day before
the election, interfered with the employees' free choice of a barBecause wage rates are a matter of utgaining repre~entative.~~
most concern to the employees, the Board found that any misrepresentations of wage rates could have had a significant impact
on the election.40The Board overruled cases previously requiring
that misrepresentations must be deliberate41and stated its new
rule for the regulation of campaign misstatements:
[A]n election should be set aside only where there has been a
misrepresentation or other similar campaign trickery, which
involves a substantial departure from the truth, a t a time which
prevents the other party or parties from making an effective
reply, so that the misrepresentation, whether deliberate or not,
may reasonably be expected to have a significant impact on the
election.42

Until the decision in the instant case, the Board considered the
36. The telegram said that the employees had no voice in accepting the contract the
union was negotiating with the employer and that the union was preventing the employer
from granting wage increases. Id. a t 902-03.
37. Id. a t 904. The Board stated the rule in terms of legitimate campaign propaganda
rather than in terms of interference with free choice, but the holding in United States
Gypsum makes it clear that there had been interference with free choice. Both earlier (e.g.,
Gummed Products) and later (e.g., Hollywood Ceramics) cases indicate that the
"ultimate consideration [in evaluation of campaign propaganda] is whether the challenged propaganda has lowered the standards of campaigning to the point where the
uninhibited desires of the employees cannot be determined in an election." Gummed
Prods. Co., 112 N.L.R.B. at 1094. The Board in fact found that free choice had been
interfered with when it said that the "bounds of legitimate campaign propaganda have
been exceeded." United States Gypsum Co., 130 N.L.R.B. a t 904.
38. 140 N.L.R.B. 221 (1962).
39. Id. at 225.
40. Id.
41. Id. a t 224 n.8.
42. Id. (footnote omitted).

214

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[1978:

Hollywood Ceramics rule to be "the definitive statement of its
policies regarding campaign misrepresentation^."^^

Holding that it would no longer look into the truth or falsity
of campaign propaganda, the NLRB overruled the Hollywood
Ceramics rule in the instant case.44The Board felt that the rule
did not serve to protect the employees' freedom of choice, but
rather "tended to impede the attainment of that
In addition, the Board found numerous ill effects produced by the
Hollywood Ceramics rule, "includ[ing] extensive analysis of
campaign propaganda, restriction of free speech, variance in application as between the Board and the courts, increasing litigation, and a resulting decrease in the finality of the election results," and attributed these ill effects to the "nature of the stand a r d ~ "employed
~~
by the Board.47The Board saw the variance
-

43. R. WILLIAMS,
P. JANUS,
& K. HUHN,supra note 9, a t 26.
44. Shopping Kart Food Mkt., Inc., 94 L.R.R.M. 1705 (NLRB 1977). Two members
of the Board, Fanning and Jenkins, dissented. Id. at 1709.
The majority made it clear, however, that the holding in the instant case did not
affect the Board's policy of regulating "campaign conduct which interferes with employee
free choice outside the area of misrepresentation." Id. at 1708. The Board noted also that
the United Aircraft rule was also unaffected by the holding in the instant case and that
elections would continue to be overturned where forged documents make it impossible for
employees to recognize campaign propaganda because of its misleading form. Id. at 1708
n.27.
45. Id. a t 1706.
The Board emphasized that it had the authority to decline to probe into the truth or
falsity of campaign statements. Id. at 1705. Relying on NLRB v. A.J. Tower Co., 329 U.S.
324 (1946), the Board stated that "the Supreme Court has long recognized that the Board
possesses a 'wide degree of discretion' in performing its function of establishing policies
and procedures to safeguard the conduct of representation elections." 94 L.R.R.M. a t
1706. The Board also cited NLRB v. J. Weingarten Inc., 420 U.S. 251 (1975), in which
"the Court held that [the Board's] administrative discretion in the decisionmaking process necessarily includes the authority to revise or modify principles previously adopted."
94 L.R.R.M. at 1706. The Board found further support in a Fifth Circuit case which
acknowledged that the laboratory-conditions standard was "adopted originally by the
Board, not the courts, and, accordingly, is controlling only 'until the Board announces a
change and its reasons for the change.' " 94 L.R.R.M. at 1706 (quoting Foremost Dairies
of the South v. NLRB, 416 F.2d 392 (5th Cir. 1969)).
46. "If a standard of truth and accuracy could actually provide an administrable norm, something might be said for adopting such a view. But this
possibility tends to dissolve on more careful analysis. In the welter of words
exchanged during a heated campaign, it is plaintly [sic] impractical to intervene upon every misstatement made by the agents of the union or the employer.
Thus, judges and administrators have long recognized that inaccurate or misleading assertions should be proscribed only under certain conditions. These
qualifications, however, immediately begin to blur the line between the licit and
illicit." . . .

....
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between the Board's and the courts' application of the Hollywood
Ceramics rule as producing protracted litigation and further
delay in the implementation of the employees' choice of bargaining representati~e.~~
The major reason for the Board's rejection of the Hollywood
Ceramics rule was its belief that the employees did not need the
Board's protection from campaign misrepresentation^.^^ The majority reasoned that employees are "mature individuals who are
capable of recognizing campaign propaganda for what it is and
discounting it. "50 In short, the Board found that misrepresentations do not affect the employees' free and untrammeled choice
of bargaining representative^.^^ Support for this conclusion was
found in a recent study of voter behavior in representation elect i o n ~The
. ~ ~study had indicated that voting decisions are based
on precampaign predilection, that voters generally pay little attention to the campaigns, and that misrepresentations do not
significantly affect voter choice.53

In the instant case, the NLRB reversed a longstanding policy
of regulating campaign misrepresentations without making substantial changes in the traditional framework of campaign regulation. While part of the Board's regulatory scheme was rejected,
the basic premises of regulation stayed unchanged: impairment
of free choice remains the measure of impermissible election interferen~e.~~
. . . Professor Bok concluded that restrictions on the content of campaign
propaganda requiring truthful and accurate statements "resist every effort at
clear formulation and tend inexorably to give rise to vague and inconsistent
rulings which baffle the parties and provoke litigation."
94 L.R.R.M. at 1706 (quoting Bok, supra note 15, at 85, 92).
47. Id.
The dissent in the instant case did not find the ill effects claimed by the majority to
be of any significance. See id. a t 1710-12.
48. Id. at 1707. See, e.g., Lake Odessa Mach. Prods., Inc., 512 F.2d 762 (6th Cir.
1975); La Crescent Constant Care Center, Inc., 510 F.2d 1319 (8th Cir. 1974); Henderson
Trumbull Supply Corp., 501 F.2d 1224 (2d Cir. 1974).
49. 94 L.R.R.M. at 1707.
50. Id.
51. See id.
52. Id. The study referred to was Getman & Goldberg, The Behavioral Assumptions
Underlying NLRB Regulation of Campaign Misrepresentations: An Empirical
Evaluation, 28 STAN.L. REV. 263 (1976). The complete findings of the study were subsequently published in J. GETMAN,
S. GOLDBERG,
& J. HERMAN,
supra note 18.
53. Getman & Goldberg, supra note 52, at 283.
54. 94 L.R.R.M. a t 1707.
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Continued Existence of Free Choice Framework in
Campaign Regulation

The Board supported its attack on the Hollywood Ceramics
rule by, first, finding numerous ill effects attributable to the
rule's applicationJ5and, second, finding that campaign misrepresentations did not, in fact, affect free choice.56In support of this
latter conclusion, the NLRB referred to an empirical study supporting its view that misrepresentations did not interfere with
free
It is the second finding, that misrepresentations do not affect
free choice, that spelled the death knell for Hollywood Ceramics.
The rule's purported ill effects and the empirical study are not
essential to the holding in the instant caseJ8and can probably be
viewed merely as further justificationJ9 for the demise of the
Hollywood Ceramics rule. The rule had originally been adopted
to protect the employees' freedom of choice;60when in the instant
case the Board determined that campaign misrepresentations do
not actually affect freedom of choice, the rule became surplusage
and rejection of the rule followed directly. Thus, the free choice
test that had once provided the reason for the birth of the
Hollywood Ceramics rule, twenty years later has provided the
reason for its demise?
The Board was careful to keep the free choice test intact. The
free choice test, it should be noted, has been used by the Board
to justify regulations of the time," place," and manner" of elec55. See notes 46-47 and accompanying text supra.
56. 94 L.R.R.M. at 1707.
57. Id.
58. The NLRB would have continued to administer the Hollywood Ceramics rule in
spite of its ill effects if the Board had believed that misrepresentations interfered with the
employees' free choice. Id.
59. The Board was careful to show that it had the authority to overrule Hollywood
Ceramics-possibly indicating a concern about the acceptance of the holding in the instant case. See id. at 1705-06.
60. Hollywood Ceramics Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 221, 223 (1962). The Board has said that
the basic purpose of election regulation "is to assure the employees full and complete
freedom of choice in selecting a bargaining representative." Id.
61. 94 L.R.R.M. at 1708.
While indicating that the assumptions that produced the Hollywood Ceramics rule
probably never had any validity, the Board said that improvements in education and
employee sophistication over the years have made their validity even more doubtful. Id.
at 1707.
62. E.g., Peerless Plywood Co., 107 N.L.R.B. 427 (1953) (prohibits campaign
speeches made on company time within 24 hours of an election).
63. E.g., Peoria Plastic Co., 117 N.L.R.B. 545 (1957) (noncoercive employer interviews at employees' homes interferes with free choice); Spartan Aircraft Co., 111N.L.R.B.
1373 (1955) (electioneering near polls interferes with free choice).
64. E.g., General Shoe Corp., 97 N.L.R.B. 499, 501 (1951): ''[qhe technique of
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tioneering without regard to content? The retention of the free
choice standard saves the Board the trouble of developing a new
standard or analytical framework for the regulation of campaign
propaganda that may or may not have been readily accepted by
the courts." The decision in the instant case also preserves a
standard that the Board has found particularly useful. The free
choice standard is both respectablew and flexible." Perhaps unfortunately, however, the combination of the free choice standard
and the Board's claimed and accepted expertisea in determining
when the standard has been breached invites the Board to substitute conclusions for analysis.70
Because the Board was able to retain the free choice test
while rejecting the Hollywood Ceramics rule, the holding of the
instant case should produce a minimal disruptive effect on the
NLRB's regulation of representation elections. NLRB supervision
will continue as before except that the substance of a misrepresentation will no longer provide a basis for the setting aside of
representation election results.71But, misrepresentations may
still result in the overturning of an election because of the manner
in which they are made.72The Board has indicated that deceptive
campaign practices involving the Board or its processes or the use
of forged documents will result in the overturning of an election
under the holding in the instant case.73This result is essentially
the level of campaign regulation set out in United Aircraft Corp.74
calling the employees into the Employer's offices individually and in small groups and
there urging that they reject the Union [is] in itself conduct which [interferes with free
choice]."
65. Possible alternative justifications for the regulation of campaign conduct are
fairness and propriety. See Bok, supra note 15, a t 53-57.
66. See note 59 supra.
67. The free choice standard has been around since 1948. General Shoe Corp. 77
N.L.R.B. 124, 126 (1948). The courts have accepted the free choice standard and applied
it in their review of Board decisions. See, e.g., Wilkinson Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 456 F.2d 298,
303 (8th Cir. 1972); NLRB v. Golden Age Beverage Co., 415 F.2d 26, 32 (5th Cir. 1969).
68. The holding in the instant case demonstrates the flexibility of the free choice
standard. See notes 58, 60-63 and accompanying text supra.
69. See note 20 supra.
70. See Asher, NLRB Representation Elections-Some of the Problems Confronting
Unions, 17 N.Y. CONF.LAB.213, 221-22 (1964).
Because of the ad hoc nature of the Board's regulation of campaign propaganda,
requiring an analysis of the reasons for overturning an election in a particular case may
not be especially useful as a guide for the conduct of others; the requirement does, however, ensure that the decision in the particular case is somewhat reasoned.
71. 94 L.R.R.M. at 1708.
72. Id.
73. Id. See Formoc, Inc., 96 L.R.R.M. 1393 (NLRB 1977).
74. 103 N.L.R.B. 102 (1953).
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twenty-four years ago-only where it is impossible for employees
to recognize information as campaign propaganda will misrepresentations be found to violate the free choice rule.75

B. Implications i n the Coercive Propaganda Context
The Board's rationale in the instant case adequately explains
why it overruled Hollywood Ceramics, and perhaps no more
should be expected. However, the rationale used by the Board
creates a troublesome conflict. The Board treats coercive propaganda differently than misrepresentations, notwithstanding the
fact that the Board's rationale in the instant case is as applicable
to coercive propaganda as it is to misrepresentation^.^^
The ill effects the Board found attributable to the Hollywood
Ceramics rule are also produced by the regulation of campaign
propaganda that is threatening or coercive according to the
Board's standards. Those ill effects "include extensive analysis of
campaign propaganda, restriction of free speech, variance in application [of the rule] as between the Board and the courts,
increasing litigation, and a resulting decrease in the finality of
election results."77 Yet, the Board has indicated it intends to
continue regulating coercive campaign propaganda despite any
possible "ill effects."78Therefore, the holding in the instant case
may not dispel the "ill effects" specifically cited by the Board as
products of the Hollywood Ceramics rule. A n y regulation of campaign propaganda, whether for misrepresentation or coercion,
must necessarily involve extensive analysis of campaign propaganda. Also implicit in any scheme of campaign regulation is
some restriction of free speech.79The Board and the courts have
also differed as to when propaganda believed to be coercive has
interfered with the employees' freedom of choice, and the variance has produced the same protracted litigation that plagued
the Hollywood Ceramics rule.80Whenever the Board overturns an
75. See notes 28-29 and accompanying text supra.
76. 94 L.R.R.M. a t 1712 (dissenting opinion).
77. Id. a t 1706 (majority opinion).
78. Id. a t 1708.
79. The Board cannot regulate the content of campaign statements without placing
limits on what may be said. For example, the dissent in the instant case maintained that
misrepresentations do not fall under the protection of the first amendment. Id. a t 1712.
The laboratory-conditions (free choice) standard was developed by the Board to circumvent the free speech clause of the NLRA. R. WILLIAMS,
P. JANUS,& K . Hum, supra note
9, a t 9.
80. See, e.g., Wilkinson Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 456 F.2d 298 (8th Cir. 1972); National
Can Corp. v. NLRB, 374 F.2d 796 (7th Cir. 1967).
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election, whether because the campaign propaganda is misleading or because it is coercive, the finality of the election is postponed and litigation is increased accordingly.
Ironically, the empirical study relied upon by the Board
makes no distinction between the effects of misleading campaign
propaganda and the effects of coercive propaganda on employee
' study found that "[vloting behavior in
voting b e h a ~ i o r . ~The
elections involving campaign tactics believed [by the Board] to
be coercive is not significantly different from voting behavior in
campaigns that conform to the Board's standard of 'laboratory
conditions.' "82 The study found that union supporters are likely
to perceive threats in ambiguous statements made by their employers, but the data indicated that the perceived threats did not
affect the employees' voting beha~ior.~V3pecifically,
the study
showed that "[e]mployees who want union representation vote
for the union despite threats or promises designed to cause them
~ ~ study recommended that "[tlhe Board
to do ~ t h e r w i s e . "The
should no longer set aside elections or find unfair labor practices
based on written or oral campaign communications by employers
or unions ."85
Thus, both the ill effects produced by the regulation of coercive campaign propaganda and the results of the empirical study
could support a Board conclusion, similar to that in the instant
case, t h a t coercive propaganda does not affect employee free
choice. The Board, as noted, however, has expressly indicated
81. The article cited by the Board was only a partial summary of the empirical study,
and was limited to the misrepresentation aspect of the Board's regulation of campaign
S. GOLDBERG,
&
propaganda. The complete findings were later published in J. GETMAN,
J. HERMAN,
supra note 18. The Book made no distinction between coercive propaganda
and misleading propaganda. See id. a t 150. Thus, empirical evidence of the quality used
to support the Board's finding as to misrepresentations exists to support the contention
that propaganda found coercive by the Board also does not affect employee free choice.
The Board's reliance on the law review article rather than the book, if consciously
made, would imply that it did not agree with the conclusions in the book as to coercive
propaganda. Although there is nothing in the majority opinion to indicate knowledge of
the book, the dissent was familiar with it, and it can be fairly inferred that the majority
was also knowledgeable. Shopping Kart Food Mkt., Inc., 94 L.R.R.M. a t 1712 (dissenting
opinion).
For a comment on the complete empirical study, see Symposium-Four Perspectives
on Union Representation Elections: Law & Reality, 28 STAN.L. REV.1161 (1976).
S. GOLDBERG,
& J. HERMAN,
supra note 18, a t 146.
82. J. GETMAN,
83. Id. a t 141.
84. Id. a t 147.
85. Id. a t 150. The study suggests that NLRB regulation of election campaigns comes
too late in the employees' decisionmaking process to provide any protection. Those employees susceptible to coercion are coerced long before the regulated preelection period
begins. See id. a t 129.
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that it will continue to regulate coercive campaign propaganda,
but in so doing gave no reasons for its apparent inconsisten~y.~~
The instant case implies that the distinguishing feature of misrepresentations as compared to coercive propaganda is that misrepresentations do not, in the Board's view, affect free choice.87
Deregulation of propaganda presently regarded as coercive awaits
only a Board composed of three members willing to conclude that
such propaganda does not affect free choice. Available empirical
data could easily support such a conclusion.

C . Alternative Rationales
Since the empirical study relied upon by the Board supports
the proposition that neither campaign misrepresentation nor
coercive propaganda affects the outcome of union elections, the
Board's decision to deregulate the one activity but not the other
seems contradictory. The Board could have reconciled that contradiction in a number of ways.
The contradiction could have been avoided by a Board finding that the study was spurious with respect to coercive propaganda. While this approach eliminates the contradiction, it is not
analytically sound. There seems to be no reason to weigh the
empirical evidence more heavily in one case than in another.
Alternatively, the Board could have reconciled its decision
with the empirical data by relying upon the presumption that
certain types of activity affect free choice. The Board could have
concluded that the empirical data was strong enough to overcome
a weaker presumption that misrepresentations influence voting
behavior, but not strong enough to overcome a much stronger
presumption that coercive propaganda influences voting behavior. Common sense would allow such a weighing of the two presumptions in relationship to the data. This conclusion would also
seem to flow naturally from the premise that coercion may
amount to an unfair labor practice, which would certainly be a
violation of the free choice test.88
In the pagt the Board has not required that coercion (in the
case of unfair labor practices) or coercive propaganda (in the case
of interference with free choice) actually influence the employees
or that it actually affect the outcome of the election." Rather, the
86. Shopping Kart Food Mkt., Inc., 94 L.R.R.M. at 1708.
87. The dissent in the instant case expressed fear that the majority's ultimate purpose may be the deregulation of campaign propaganda. Id. at 1712 (dissenting opinion).
88. See notes 22-26 and accompanying text supra.
89. E.g., NLRB v. Triangle Publications, Inc., 500 F.2d 597 (3d Cir. 1974) (unfair
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Board has looked to the character and circumstances of the objectionable conduct in determining if the coercive propaganda has
affected free choice.g0Thus, as an alternative to the inherently
contradictory rationale in the instant case, empirical evidence
concerning the actual effects of coercive propaganda could have
explicitly been found to have no bearing on the Board's present
policy toward the regulation of campaign propaganda.
Lastly, an alternative rationale may be discerned from the
purpose of the NLRA itself. Congress has expressed an intent to
protect employees from being coerced or restrained in their free
choice of bargaining representative^.^' Implicit in this expression
of congressional intent is the conclusion that threats and coercion
do affect the employees' freedom of choice. Congress has not
manifested any similar intent to protect employees from the effects of misrepresentations. Given the employer's economic power
over the employees, and the employees' certain awareness of
that power, the conclusion appears entirely rational. Thus, the
Board could have expressly concluded that any change in policy
regarding the regulation of coercive propaganda should be left to
Congress, but that it was free to change its policy regarding misrepresentations.
Any of the above methods could have been used by the Board
to avoid the contradiction that resulted from the Board's reliance
on the empirical study. The Board failed, however, to make any
attempt in the instant case to define the role such studies should
play in Board decisions. The Board's uncritical acceptance of the
study places a stamp of approval on techniques and conclusions
that are far from infallible. Rather than treating the evidence in
an authoritative manner, a better reasoned course would have
been to emphasize the fallibility of empirical evidence and to
relegate it to a minor role. The correctness of law or policy should
not be determined by statistical surveys.
labor practice); Westside Hosp., 218 N.L.R.B. 96 (1975) (interference with free choice);
Steak House Meat Co., 206 N.L.R.B. 28 (1973) (interference with free choice); Central
Photocolor Co., 195 N.L.R.B. 839 (1972) (interference with free choice).
But, before the Board will find that a misrepresentation has interfered with free
choice, the misrepresentation must be found to have had a significant impact on voter
choice. Hollywood Ceramics Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 221, 224 (1962).
90. Steak House Meat Co., 206 N.L.R.B. 28 (1973); Central Photocolor Co., 195
N.L.R.B. 839 (1972).
91. 29 U.S.C. $158(a)(l)(1970) (employer coercion); id. 8 158(b)(l) (union coercion).
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IV. CONCLUSION

*

The Board in the instant case accomplished its purpose-the
deregulation of misrepresentations-but in doing so left two questions unanswered: (1) What part should empirical data play in
Board decisions?, and (2) What, given the rationale in the instant
case, distinguishes the regulation of coercive propaganda from
the regulation of misrepresentations? The latter question could
have been answered in any one of the ways previously discussed.
Considering the Board's plainly expressed desire to continue regulation of coercive propaganda, the Board, if pushed to it, will
likely distinguish the regulation of coercive propaganda in some
way. However, an answer to the latter question may, but will not
necessarily, resolve the first. In the decisionmaking process, the
Board should take empirical data into consideration only after
careful evaluation. Empirical data is not so accurate as to warrant the Board placing unflinching confidence on it.

Thomas R. Vuksinick

